

## **How To Use This Book**

This book is intended to offer you my travel experiences to Singapore and Thailand, along with providing general and practical advice pertaining to those countries. It is designed to take you to sites famous and infamous dealing with WW2 in the Pacific from cemeteries, battle sites, cuttings, bridges, waterfalls to hot springs etc.

I have attempted to cover the main themes of the Fall of Singapore and the Thai/Burma Railway on the Thai side. I apologise in advance if I have missed anything important to you, one can imagine there are many places to visit in both Singapore and Thailand, the information is provided for a snapshot - a basic introduction to the site, it is therefore up to you to continue research on these places if your interests are heightened. For further research see the bibliography of this publication along with the recommended internet research sites; the AWM and the IWM are excellent places to visit to conduct research and of course the TBRC. Individuals chosen to be visited for this book have been selected either because they played some major part (like LTCOL Ivan Lyon and CPL Rod Breavington) or because of their date of death, or due to them being the oldest, youngest or some other odd fact about their death or that they were mentioned by LTCOL Dunlop etc. I have mentioned many Melbourne Cricket Club (MCC) Members who died in Kranji, Kanchanaburi or at sea, because I have an interest in them being an MCC member myself. There are thousands of men in all the war cemeteries we are to visit, I would like to include them all, however this is not possible - the randomness of their selection adds to the brevity of the scale of what we are about to see. I have used many quotes by ExPOWs to offer their thoughts whilst you are visiting places synonymous with their war time service.

Read all the 'pre-tour' information and general advice before you go including all the miscellaneous information - work out what it is you really want to do and prepare an itinerary based on the places you want to go. When you are at the Kanchanaburi War Cemetery for example, take out this book and read the pages dedicated to this site. I have used many other publications for this book in order to have ExPOWs' opinions and facts etc, highlighted throughout where possible, this not

only provides excellent reference material but also gives you informed data by men who were there. The tours are divided into sections and I have included a 'time bracket' for the approximate time it will take to visit that particular section. The sections in Singapore I have placed near public transport, eg. The City Hall Tour begins at City Hall MRT.

Many times I have thought I would not publish this book for fear of upsetting folk. I've highlighted many people from the past (well before my time) that have died in tragic circumstances; unfortunately circumstances that could have been avoided. If only a few books are sold and that handful of people visit some of these places – then I will have achieved my purpose. I have tried to contact next of kin where possible, however this has proved very difficult; I have been in contact with school archivists, other historians both in Australia and abroad, CWGC, telephone directories and other means – I have sent off letters to names in the phone book hoping one of them is related; one runs into difficulty when you come across more common names. I was close to deleting all the names I had researched and put into this book (there is over a dozen fellas I mention) but then I thought isn't remembering the whole concept of Lest We Forget? And then I thought of the famous saying, 'Tell them when you get home that I gave my tomorrow for your today' – then I thought would I want people to visit my dad if he lay in an offshore cemetery far away, lay some flowers, say a prayer or read a poem – and I felt comfortable with that – dad is buried in the new Cheltenham Cemetery (Victoria Australia) and mum says he would be happy ('coz he's laying between two sheilas!). I read a book which sealed my decision to use the names – it was 'We Will Remember Them – Australian Epitaphs of WW1' by John Laffin (1995) which was a great tribute to many Australian sons, maybe I could discuss some fellas I have researched and promote Lest We Forget.

Keep safe, have a great holiday in Singapore and the 'Land of the Smiles', these countries are fascinating places to visit and they are littered with WW2 sites. Bear in mind these places can and do have an emotional drain, couple this with the normal complexities of travel and tempers can become short. This pilgrimage will be an unforgettable journey, one that will pop into your mind at odd stages when you come back home. Chog Dee. (Good Luck).

## Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank my wife and kids for being patient with me on this project, both for my time in travel and for the time spent in the office typing and researching etc. Thanks to Rod Beattie for his time in responding to my many emails over the years, the information he has provided and a special thanks to him for all the work he does in Kanchanaburi that is aimed at remembrance - without Rod many people would not be as well informed on the Thai/Burma Railway who come to visit; when I had a question(s) Rod searched his database and provided me with answers. Thanks to the many people that have aided my research including: Mr Bill Haskell (ExPOW), Ms Lindsey Shaw of the Australian National Maritime Museum, Huge Cope (TBRC), Roger Maunsell (Centre for Research Allied POWs Under the Japanese USA), NARA Washington DC USA, Jean Francois Helias (Fishing Adventures Thailand). Khun A for driving me around Kanchanaburi and Sangklaburi on many occasions and for my constant 'Turn here' demands - Khun A drove both Phil and I on one occasion from 9AM to 2100 hours - on the day his wife had given birth - he gave up his time for us for a family event very special to him - we accordingly tipped him well thanks Khun A.

Duncan Pescod (Hong Kong), Bill Slape and Ayr Steer (Hellfire Pass Museum Thailand) - special thanks to Ayr for arranging on several occasions my entry into Home Phu Toey - I will provide a bottle of good Aussie Red as promised! Stickman (Bangkok), Alf Bachelder (MCC), Dick Briggs (Scotch College), Roger Ladyman (Perth), Julie Lee and Russell Atkinson (Aust War Memorial), Thai Visa, Wes Injerd, Mr Nefu (Battlebox Singapore).

Elizabeth Gertsakis and Bruce Davidson (Australia Post Philatelic Group), Frank (ExPOW) and Judy Stecklein (Texas USA), Peter Francis (CWGC London), John Howard (Australian Prime Minister), Roy Whitecross (ExPOW), Yvonne Mant, Robert Aspinall, Karen Ann Leong (Singapore Walks), Suchin Jienjilert (RKVH). Joost Herweijer (Holland). Leone Fuz and Dr VivienneThom (RoyalAustralianMint),

A.C.Bijsmans (Netherlands Wargraves Foundation), Carrol Cooper (COFEPOW), IanDenys Peek (ExPOW) and Roxarne Burns (Pan Macmillan), Jayne Correll (Subcorp), Jim (ExPOW) and Tonia Casey, Alan Matthews (Force Z), Lyn Vaughan (BoolarongPress), Angela Crocombe (Penguin), Bruce Constable (HMAS Perth), Ted Harris (Digger History), Nolan D. Anthony (ExPOW USA), Lisa Lim (Fortress Singapore), Peter Stubbs (Kranji War Cemetery), FSGT Peter Spring (RAAF), Chris Beard, Don Chistison and family, LT COL Bill Henderson and Kathleen McCleskey (USA), Donna Liew (Singapore Tourism Board), Lynette Ramsay-Silver (Author/historian) and Jeanne McArthur (Ex RAAF).

Thank-you to all the various publications that gave me permission to use them as quoted works - it gives the reader a chance to travel with ExPOWs where they may not have had the chance or privilege to do so.

Finally, thanks to Ron Mason, Malani Mason, Phil Martina and Richard McArthur for allowing me to drag you all half way around the world on various occasions and to all sorts of odd places. The publications that I have referenced are excellent further research into these topics. Thank-you from one Australian generation to another, without you life could be so different. I saw an excellent saying the other day and it went something like this: 'If you can read this thank a school teacher, if it is in English, thank a soldier'. Lest We Forget.

## **The Fall of Singapore:**

From many accounts the fall of Singapore was destined to occur for many reasons. Some authors say it was ineptitude on LTGEN Percival in spreading his troops too thinly along the stretch at Kranji (the Australians), not joining the Australian forces on the island to embrace one solid fighting unit, having troops not sufficiently trained and equipped to fight a foe that was battle hardy from years of fighting in China. Others say a combination of the above, and poor preparedness on behalf of the military and civil administrations, by concentrating their defences in areas where attacks just did not occur; like the mighty guns facing the southern seas when the attacks came from the north via land; therefore allowing holes in Singapore's defence.

Lack of artillery/ammunition, lack of air support, rations, concerns for the civil population, non implementation of Operation Matador

(defences for the northern advances) and many other war making essentials were either reduced or mismanaged. What the fighting forces had however, was an eagerness to fight their enemy which they did with valour under conditions where they 'were under the pump' from the start. For example LTCOL C. Anderson, Commander of the 2/19 Battalion AIF was awarded the Victoria Cross for his legendary bravery, leadership and courage in action at the Battle of Muar - Malaya - he had earned a Military Medal in WW1 also. The Allies fought fierce battles down the Malayan Peninsula, in places like Gemas, Muar, Parit Sulong etc. The latter should be considered a household name in Australia however sadly it is not; hence my inclusion of it in this book. Parit Sulong is about 80 kms from Singapore and what happened there was one of the first (certainly not the last) atrocities that the IJA engaged on our troops and what could be expected over the following 3.5 years of occupation.

The following information I have sourced from Gilbert Mant's (1992) 'The Singapore Surrender', subtitled 'The Greatest Disaster in British Military History.' It tells a succinct and poignant story of the Massacre at Parit Sulong; for further reading on the massacre, please find 'The Massacre at Parit Sulong' by Gilbert Mant with excerpts from ExPOW Ben Hackney (one of the survivors), it is an amazing story of survival by Mr Hackney - the Aussie they couldn't kill - and by his account they definitely tried.

### **Parit Sulong by Gilbert Mant:**

'It was eight and a half years before a horrified world heard about the fate of the wounded men, and other prisoners, who were left behind at Parit Sulong. Then, in June 1950, at a War Crimes court at Los Negros, Manus Island, ghastly details were given of one of the most cold-blooded massacres in the history of warfare. In the dock was LTGEN Takuma Nishimura, charged with the murder of 110 Australian and 35 Indian POWs at Parit Sulong on 22 January 1942. The accuser was Lt Ben Hackney of 2/29<sup>th</sup> Battalion AIF, sole living survivor of the massacre. He was 26 years old when the massacre took place. Hackney, a Bathurst (NSW Australia) grazier in civil life, survived machine-gunning, rifle fire, bayoneting, mass cremation and subsequent recapture and imprisonment. He became known as 'the man they could not kill'.

He feigned death to escape and tell his damning story eight and a half years later. He spent 36 days crawling about the Malayan jungle, with a bullet wound in his left leg, shell splinters in his back, right calf and behind his right knee. He was recaptured by Malayan policemen and taken to Changi Gaol, Singapore. There he wrote the story of the massacre and buried it in a shell case. The shell case was recovered after the war and its contents included in the six typewritten pages of sworn evidence given by Hackney at Manus in 1950.

The Parit Sulong prisoners, many of them badly wounded, were made to sit, some in the nude, in a circle ringed by Jap guards (Hackney's evidence ran). About sunset, the prisoners, their hands tied behind their backs with rope or wire, were herded together and shot. The officers were tied together first, then other ranks in the same manner. 'Often a soldier who was more difficult to tie because of his wounds, was subjected to lashings, sometimes with wire, and kicked,' Hackney testified. Later, Japanese soldiers poured petrol from tins over other prisoners, many of whom were still conscious, and set them alight. In feigning death, Hackney displayed extraordinary fortitude, perhaps conscious that he must stay alive to assure that some day justice would be wreaked for this fiendish deed. He was kicked on countless occasions on all parts of the body, especially on the wound in his back. He was battered over the head with rifle butts, prodded with bayonets more than 20 times to see if he were still alive. He survived it all and at Manus, Nishimura was found guilty of ordering the massacre, and sentenced to hang. When sentenced, he said contritely from the dock: 'I am deeply sorry that, due to my carelessness, such an incident happened. I wish to give prayers with sorrow to those who were killed.' Nishimura was hanged at Los Negros on 11 June 1951. Death was instantaneous and he was buried at sea because torrential rains upset plans for the cremation of his body. He thus had a far more merciful death than the victims of his atrocity.' (Mant, 1992: 72-3).

'The Japanese 25<sup>th</sup> Army - comprising the 5<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup> and Imperial Guards' Divisions, had about 67,000 men with 150 tanks and 560 aircraft, though smaller in number in terms of troops, it had superior air support and tanks.' (MAJ Yap et al, 1992: 12).

Yamashita tasked his 5<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Divisions for the assault on Singapore from the Northwest shoreline. The Imperial Guards (under

Nishimura) would head a diversion in the east at Pulau Ubin. Percival had Singapore divided up into three areas:

- a. LTGEN Lewis Heath - northern sector - British 18<sup>th</sup> Division, Indian 9<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> Divisions;
- b. MAJGEN Gordon Bennett OIC of the western section with the Australian 8<sup>th</sup> Division and the untrained Indian 44<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade; and
- c. MAJGEN Keith Simmons OIC of the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Malaya Infantry Regiment, the Straits Settlement Volunteer Force, fortress troops and other fixed defences in the southern areas.

‘Percival had approximately 80,000 troops which were dispersed all over peninsular Malaya guarding airfields and important installations. He had no tanks (only light gun carriers) and 150 obsolete planes.’ (MAJ Yap et al, 1992: 12).

The Royal Navy had lost HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, Britain could not send any ships to assist and the Americans were pulling themselves together from the Pearl attacks. The loss of the British ships was a huge blow to the morale of the people on Singapore. Were the initials of the **Prince of Wales** an omen of what was to come? CAPT Sonokawa Kameo of the Imperial Japanese Navy held various flight leading positions with the Navy over a period of several years. Commander T. Moorer of the US Navy with Interpreter LTCOM Millstein of the USNR present subsequently interrogated him after the war. Many questions were asked of the IJN Pilot who was part of the flight team that sunk the Repulse and Prince of Wales:

Q. ‘What types of attacks did you specialise in?’

A. Bombing and torpedo attacks against ships; also night operations.

Q. How were the two ships located?

A. We had previous intelligence reports that the British battleships were probably in the area but did not know for sure. On 8 Dec the ships were photographed in Singapore Harbour. There were no air searches on 9 Dec because of bad weather. However, on 9 Dec the ships were sighted by a submarine, which gave their position.

Q. Describe the method of attack - who controlled the attack?

A. The attacks were controlled by the flight leaders and were ordered according to the situation. The general plan was to attack continuously leading off with a bombing attack from 2500 metres by the Genzan Group. They were followed in turn by the Mihoro and Kanoya Groups as soon as they arrived. The first attack began at 1130.

Q. Estimate the number of hits received by the British Ships.

A. The Repulse was hit by one or two bombs and about 12 torpedoes. One bomb and 10 torpedoes hit the Prince of Wales. I am not sure about the bomb hits.

Q. How many aircraft were lost?

A. A total of four aircraft were lost during the attacks. (AWM 423/6/30 from Force Z-survivors, 2003).

‘As the ship was going over to port, we were directed to go over the starboard side; this would stop you being caught on the submerging superstructure. I decided to slide down as far as the torpedo blisters on the ship’s side and from there, find the best point of entry into the water. It was a good idea, but in reality, didn’t happen this way. As soon as I started to move, with the actual surface of the ship being covered in oil, I couldn’t stop my progress, going straight over the torpedo blister and out into fresh air. The bulge had actually acted as a catapult and threw me some distance from the ship. It seemed to take an age to get to the surface, but I will never forget one of my last sights of Repulse. Almost totally on her port side, still steaming fast with her starboard propellers clear of the water, that moment has never left me and is one of the most vivid recollections I still hold, of the death of our ship.’ (John Garner HMS Repulse, from Forcez-Survivors, 2003).

The Royal Navy and subsequently the defending Allies suffered one of their greatest Naval losses - the sinking on 10 December 1941 of HMS Repulse and the Prince Of Wales by the IJN Aircraft, 80 kilometres off the coast of Kuantan, Malaysia - 840 men died as a result - RIP.

MAJGEN Bennett’s 4.5-mile Singapore coastline defended by 750 men was far too stretched to be effective, as coastal defences could not be put up in time to offer any suitable resistance. The IJA invaded and took Pulau Ubin with little resistance; they softened up the northwestern area with artillery and aerial bombing, knocking out vital

communications links between the frontlines and HQ. On the night of the 8<sup>th</sup> Feb, the IJA's 5<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Division men started to cross the river using sea craft; the Australian Machine Gunners repelled many attempts, but again their numbers were too spread along the coast and gaps were found by the IJA - the Australians also started to run low on vital ammunition. 'By the third wave, the Australians were outnumbered and overwhelmed... At midnight, a red starshell burst over the Straits indicating to Yamashita the 5<sup>th</sup> Division's successful landing on Singapore soil. A white starshell burst later, to confirm the 18<sup>th</sup> Division's successful infiltration.' (MAJ Yap et al, 1992: 12).

MAJGEN Gordon Bennett was in charge of the Australians during the Malayan and Singapore campaigns and was reportedly in dispute with LTGEN Percival on many matters pertaining to the battles and use of his troops. (A mock surrender symposium can be viewed at the Battlebox at Fort Canning (Singapore) with all major players including Percival and Bennett, which are discussed later in this book). The following was written by Bennett immediately following the surrender; in writing his records he had to be careful not to cause morale problems with the surrendering allies and had to be diplomatic in his published words not to 'antagonise' the IJA - to ensure his remarks did not cause retribution on his incarcerated men. This is what MAJGEN Gordon Bennett had to say on the surrender of the 'Impregnable Fortress' - Singapore:

'After Parit Sulong, the Japanese concentrated on Batu Pahat, farther down the west coast. Here, as elsewhere along the west coast, they landed men in sampans they had seized. Troops who had just arrived from England and were quite unused to Malayan conditions had the sector here, and they were unsuccessful in their attempt to deny the enemy a landing at Batu Pahat. This meant that our main force at Gemas was almost cut off about 60 miles south of them. Our withdrawal from Gemas, which our men had so long and so skilfully defended, was one of the saddest events of the campaign from the Australian point of view. The men up there had resolved not to give any ground, and they had succeeded, but circumstances forced their withdrawal after they had so thoroughly proved their superiority over the Japanese. During the next week the whole force was gradually withdrawn, keeping a close eye on the Batu Pahat flank and the west coast generally, where the Japanese

were still landing from sampans, to make sure that the Japanese did not cut the road behind it. This meant withdrawing the last two battalions - 2/18<sup>th</sup> and 2/20<sup>th</sup>, from the Mersing Position. The men were saddened by the realisation that they had to withdraw without testing the strength of the defences. On the way south, the 2/18<sup>th</sup>, 2/20<sup>th</sup> and 2/10<sup>th</sup> Field Regiment dealt out severe punishment to the Japs in a bold ambush near Jemaluang. Sadly, the men crossed the Causeway to Singapore Island. By the time the force had reached the island all our reinforcements had been absorbed and all out battalions were restored to their full numbers. But the new Australians were only partly trained. Our position was strengthened by the arrival of 4<sup>th</sup> (Western Australian) Machine-Gun Battalion.

The seven Australian battalions were given the western half of the Island from the Causeway inclusive. The AIF had with it the 44<sup>th</sup> Indian Brigade. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Indian Corps, with the newly arrived English division, occupied the north-east part, and Singapore fortress troops defended the only part of the island where defences had been prepared - positions on the south coast. The task of the Australians was to begin from the beginning, to build defensive positions along a very long front. It was then that they felt far more than before their serious weakness in the air. Previously enemy aircraft had not been able to do serious damage because troops had the concealment of rubber plantations and jungle. But when the men began to build beach posts for guns and machine-guns and beach lights, Japanese aircraft flew up and down, bombing and machine-gunning them, unmolested except by the fire of anti-aircraft guns.

The Japanese were able to observe Australian positions so closely from the air that they had maps, which we captured afterwards, showing the position of every one of our mortars, machine-guns, searchlights and field-guns. When their bombardment began they destroyed every beach light and gun in the sector.

They launched their attack in boats in the dark, and, by concentrating all their efforts on one section, completely overwhelmed the thin defence. The front was too wide to be held by so small a force. By continual pressure the Japanese were able to force back our depleted units. Our units received inadequate support from others now holding parts of the line. It must be remembered that many of these troops were

completely exhausted after the long fight in Malaya, and the new formations were only partly trained and were quite unused to Malayan conditions. Even at this stage the AIF managed to form a strong perimeter, against which the enemy were smashed over and over again. But, over and over again, retirements on our flanks forced withdrawals, until our line approached the city of Singapore itself. Then the enemy was able to concentrate his whole air forces and many of his guns on Singapore, which was gradually being reduced to a heap of rubble. Casualties amongst civilians were very heavy, the city's water supply was cut off, and circumstances developed which ultimately forced the surrender of Singapore.

During the final stages our numbers were so depleted in the AIF that it was found necessary to use non-combatant troops to occupy positions in the firing line. These men - signallers, army service corps, and ordnance - did fine work. Everyone had his tail up at the end. We occupied the perimeter, from which we refused to budge, and it was in this position that we stood when the decision to surrender was made.' (MAJGEN Gordon Bennet from Mant, 1992: 74-5).

I know two ExPOWs that did not like MAJGEN Gordon Bennett, for not staying with his men and fleeing - the problem was that the men were ordered not to escape, then why did Bennett? 'Live to fight another day', is that fair whilst your men become prisoners with a host of uncertainties that lay before them? A report MAJGEN Bennett wrote when he returned to Australia mentioned that he knew he would receive criticism on his return and that he came back importantly to 'brief' commanders in tactics in combating the battle hardy Japanese. Bennett's men were not happy with him.

'Boyd told me I must not leave because of the agreement we had made. Angrily I asked, "What agreement?" He explained that we had agreed to occupy the positions we then held, and to turn over our arms the next day when ordered to do so. My mind was racing - could this be happening? My duty was to escape. But Boyd warned me that I must not attempt this because it could endanger the lives of our sick and wounded in hospital. Rage and hatred grew in my mind for Gordon Bennett, our Commander-in-Chief, when I learned he had escaped on the Sunday night, despite the fact that he had been a party to the surrender. It was quite clear to me that the Japs would not miss George Beard, but

would surely observe that Bennett had escaped. I was certainly not then, nor am I now, a fan of Gordon Bennett!’ (Beard, 2000: 68).

Percival was later critical of the lack of trained soldiers from Australia. Mant criticised Percival’s comments by adding it was in fact the ‘High Command’s methods that were out of date, it was the hidebound British text book soldier who failed against the ungentlemanly and quite untextbook Japanese.’ Singapore fell at 2030 hours on 15 February 1942. Reasons given for the capitulation were a lack of water for the population, the latter being killed enmasse by Japanese air raids, fighting men had no water, limited supply of rations and ammunition was running low.

In around two months the IJA’s ‘Blitzkrieg’ down the Malayan Peninsula had covered hundreds of miles and took possession of the ‘Impregnable Fortress’. Yamashita had postings in Germany prior to WW2 and this is perhaps one link in his rapid success down the coast; by adopting the same principles as the Germans in their rolling attack techniques. (Yamashita was not the first to adopt German military philosophy. The Kempeitai has its founding roots from German Intelligence Services where Kempeitai founders ‘borrowed’ from the German model and developed it to the ruthless and feared group it became). Many newspapers and commentators of the day painted a portrait of the IJA of a fighting group that was simply no match to the Allied model, it was foolish propaganda. Did allied brass, civil servants, military planners, the general public etc, underestimate their enemy and what he was capable of? Yamashita knew he had to hit hard and fast, similar to Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (1884-1943) and his attack on Pearl - it had to be quick, decisive and punishing. He knew a street battle would stretch his resources and draw out vital time, minimising his chances of success – Yamashita had superior air power – he could bomb the city and strategic positions at will, and harass with his troops defensive positions – he was pushing backs to the wall. It appears the cards were stacked even before a hand was dealt.

‘A few weeks after the surrender the Japs organised what we called a ‘Gloat Parade’, where we were mustered in front of Japanese newsreel cameras to be filmed for a feature which we understand was shown widely in Japanese cinemas. Our morale at the time was extremely low,

and we must have been on parade for at least five hours.’ (Beard, 2000: 71).

Following the Battle of the Java Sea, USS Houston and HMAS Perth were heading through the Sunda Strait, sailing towards safer waters of the Indian Ocean. From the previous battle they had run low on vital ammunition and fuel, so they made a stop for a partial refuel at Tanjong Priok in western Java.

Heading into the entrance of the Sunda Strait, Perth and Houston sailed head on into ‘nearly on a dozen enemy destroyers, three cruisers, numerous torpedo boats and minesweepers’ whom were protecting the main fleet’. (Moffatt, 2002). Perth and Houston fired their guns however there were too many weapons against them, the Perth went down on 28 February 1942 and then 20 minutes later USS Houston followed.

On board the Perth were 681 crew - 350 men died during that sinking including the Captain ‘Hec’ Waller. 106 men died later in captivity and only 214 boys or nearly 25% made it home after the war. USS Houston had a compliment of 1,065 men and she lost 697 crew including her Captain - A.H. Rooks, with 80 deaths in captivity; only 288 survived the war. RIP.<sup>1</sup>

Submarine No. 3 of the RAN today has a Collins Class Sub named after the Perth Captain - HMAS Waller. Due to the bureaucracy of the Imperial Medal system of the day, CAPT Waller did not receive a VC for his actions in the Java Sea or Sunda Strait. Hec Waller was born in 1900, in the Victorian town of Benalla, Australia and he joined the RAN in 1914.

‘Whilst researching files in the Australian Archives historian John Bradford of Adelaide discovered that in 1947, the Netherlands GOVT wished to posthumously award the knighthood of the ‘Militaire Willems-Ord’ to CAPT Waller for his ‘Courageous and masterly actions’ in the battles of the Java Sea and Sunda Strait. This award is the highest gallantry award that the Netherlands can bestow upon a foreign subject.’ (Constable, 2003).

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<sup>1</sup> Information from [www.spruso.com/Perth.htm](http://www.spruso.com/Perth.htm) - A Complete History of HMAS Perth; Moffatt, 2002.

Another person on board HMAS Perth was a Melbourne Cricket Club Member:

Able Seaman Ernest John Atkins PM2929 HMAS Perth

Age: 25

Grave: He has no known grave, however has a memorial reference at the Plymouth Naval Memorial in England - panel 75, Column 2.

Misc: Able Seaman Atkins played four games of Australian Rules Football for the Melbourne Football Club in 1940 and was a ruckman, the previous year he won the Woodrow Cup for the Best and Fairest player in the VAFA (A Section). He was a Melbourne Grammar School boy, held Naval quarter mile running titles and competed for Old Melbournians Athletic Club. He died in the sinking of HMAS Perth. (CWGC and Batchelder, 1995).

### **The Thai/Burma Railway:**

December 1941 the British had left it too late to launch Operation Matador, they had been warned by their own staff that Singapore was not prepared for any imminent attack - Matador was too late. The IJA advanced into Thailand with some initial intense resistance by the Thais however the IJA took the country within hours; landings occurred in Battambang in Cambodia, Don Muang Airport in Bangkok and various other sea landings including Singora and Patani on 8 December 1941. Thailand shared a Buddhist brethren with Japan, it also wanted a 'Thailand for the Thailanders' and both were heavily into trade with one another (Thailand's resources/Japan's manufacturing).

'Before dawn on 8 December the Konoe Imperials Guards Division was ready to cross the Indochina frontier at the same time as the commencement of the landing of the 5<sup>th</sup> Division at Singora. It broke through the frontier without encountering resistance of any importance, and by noon on 9 December its leading units had arrived at a position a few kilometres from Bangkok. The Iwaguro Regiment at the head of the column, and from it the Take-no-Uchi Battalion, was chosen by the regimental commander. "Select a brave and discreet officer to ascertain the state of affairs in Bangkok," he ordered. MAJ Take-no-Uchi had secretly anticipated such an order and immediately volunteered for the task himself. "As this duty is very important, please let me do it," he said.' (Tsuji, 1997: 85). Near the Comuan Aerodrome not far out of